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NOTES 
An Administrative Battle of the Forms: The EEOC's Intake 
Questionnaire and Charge of Discrimination 
Laurie M. Stegman 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1964, President Johnson signed into law the landmark Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.1 In this massive legislation, Congress intended to 
address inequities such as the longstanding problem of employment 
discrimination.2 To improve the dismal record of American employ-
ers, 3 Congress combined the tactics of persuasion and compulsion in 
an elaborate system that integrated administrative and judicial reme-
dies.4 On one hand, legislators created the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (EEOC or Commission) to act as a conciliator and 
to seek voluntary compliance,5 while on the other, Title VII provided 
a right to pursue claims in federal court to those individuals denied 
satisfaction at the administrative level. 6 The provisions that linked 
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended princi-
pally at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000h-6 (1988)). ''The bill passed the Senate on June 17, 1964, by 
a vote of76 to 18. On July 2, 1964 •.• the House of Representatives passed the Senate version of 
the bill by a vote of289 to 126. At seven o'clock that evening, President Johnson signed the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 in the East Room of the White House." Robert Belton, A Comparatfre 
Review of Public and Private Enforcement of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 V AND. 
L. REv. 905, 917 (1978) (footnotes omitted). 
2. See Julius L. Chambers & Barry Goldstein, Title VII: The Continuing Challenge of Estab-
lishing Fair Employment Practices, 49 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1986, at 9, 11-12 
("The various forms of employment discrimination established after the Civil War created the 
patterns which existed when Title VII became effective nearly 100 years later."). 
3. "In 1962, nonwhites made up 11 percent of the civilian labor force, but 22 percent of the 
unemployed ...• Moreover, among Negroes who are employed, their jobs are largely concen-
trated among the semiskilled and unskilled occupations." H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st 
Sess., pt. 2, at 27 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2513, and in EQUAL EMPLOY-
MENT OPPORTUNITY CoMMISSION, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI OF CIVIL 
RIGHTS Acr OF 1964, 2122, 2148 (1968) [hereinafter EEOC LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. 
4. See Belton, supra note I, at 907 ("Congress substituted three enforcement processes for 
cease and desist power: administrative enforcement by the EEOC, 'pattern or practice' civil 
litigation by the Attorney General, and private civil actions by aggrieved persons - the 'private 
attorney general.' ") (footnotes omitted). 
5. "If the Commission determines after such investigation that there is reasonable cause to 
believe that the charge is true, the Commission shall endeavor to eliminate any such alleged 
unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion." 
42 u.s.c. § 2000e-5(b) (1988). 
6. If a charge filed with the Commission pursuant to subsection (b) ... is dismissed by the 
Commission, or if within one hundred and eighty days from the filing of such charge ••• the 
Commission has not filed a civil action •.• or the Commission has not entered into a concili-
ation agreement to which the person aggrieved is a party, the Commission ••• shall so notify 
124 
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these disparate approaches included the requirement that an individ-
ual follow the EEOC's procedures for conciliation before filing a claim 
in court.7 Section 706(e) of Title VII as enacted authorized an individ-
ual to bring an action against an employer only after the EEOC had 
failed to obtain voluntary compliance within a maximum of sixty 
days. 8 Because this right was contingent upon filing a proper charge 
with the EEOC, absent unusually sympathetic circumstances sufficient 
to toll the filing period,9 failure to file a valid charge could result in 
denial of both administrative and judicial relief. Commentators have 
characterized this scheme as "an administrative obstacle course" 
which "plac[es] the EEOC at the courthouse door."10 
As enacted in 1964, section 706(a) described the manner in which 
an individual initiated action with the EEOC: "Whenever it is 
charged in writing under oath by a person claiming to be aggrieved ... 
that an employer ... has engaged in an unlawful employment practice, 
the Commission shall ... make an investigation of such charge."11 In 
keeping with the statute, the EEOC promulgated implementing regu-
lations on July 1, 1965, which stated that a "charge shall be in writing 
and signed, and shall be sworn to before a notary public."12 The 
EEOC also fleshed out its administrative processes by injecting a pre-
liminary step into the filing procedure. According to the 1965 regula-
tions, the Commission would receive information from any person, but 
the complainant would be assisted in filing a charge only where such 
information disclosed that the person was entitled to such help.13 
Since the mid-1960s, the EEOC's enforcement power has ex-
panded14 as has the body of regulations governing its procedures. 
Under current regulations, the EEOC will consider a charge to have 
the person aggrieved and within ninety days after the giving of such notice a civil action may 
be brought against the respondent named in the charge ...• 
42 u.s.c. § 2000e-5(t)(l) (1988). 
7. "A person claiming to be aggrieved by a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 may not maintain a suit for redress in federal district court until he has first unsuccessfully 
pursued certain avenues of potential administrative relief." Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 
523 (1972) (citation and footnote omitted). 
8. The statute granted the EEOC 30 days to conciliate with a possible extension of up to 30 
days. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706(e), reprinted in EEOC LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 
3, at 1012-13. 
9. See infra note 22 and accompanying text. 
10. 1 CHARLES A. SULLIVAN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION§ 11.2 (2d ed. 1988). 
11. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706(a), reprinted in EEOC LEGISLATIVE HISrORY, supra 
note 3, at 1011. The oath requirement currently appears in § 706(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) 
(1988). 
12. 30 Fed. Reg. 8408 (1965) (previously codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1601.8; codified as amended 
at 29 C.F.R. § 1601.9 (1991)). 
13. 30 Fed. Reg. 8408 (1965) (previously codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1601.5; currently codified at 
29 C.F.R. § 1601.6(a) (1991)). For example, the alleged acts would have to be among those 
prohibited by one of the laws administered by the EEOC. See infra notes 138-39 and accompa-
nying text. 
14. Under the 1972 Equal Employment Opportunity Act, which amended Title VII, the 
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been filed "when the Commission receives from the person making the 
charge a written statement sufficiently precise to identify the parties, 
and to describe generally the action or practices complained of."15 
Further, in the view of the EEOC, a "charge may be amended to cure 
technical defects or omissions, including failure to verify the charge," 
and such amendments "will relate back to the date the charge was first 
received."16 
Today the EEOC employs a two-step filing procedure embodied in 
a pair of forms: the Intake Questionnaire,17 which solicits preliminary 
information, and the Charge of Discrimination, 18 which formally en-
gages the EEOC's administrative machinery. In a typical claimant's 
situation, on the first visit to an EEOC office, the individual completes 
an intake questionnaire which requests her name and address, the rea-
son for the alleged discriminatory action, a brief description of the 
action complained of, and the name, address, and size of the employer. 
On the basis of this submission, an EEOC official determines whether 
grounds exist for the filing of a formal charge. If appropriate, the 
EEOC drafts a charge and presents or sends it to the claimant for 
approval and signature under oath.19 
In order for this second document to be considered a valid and 
timely charge, the complainant must sign it and file it with the EEOC 
within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act. 20 In a so-called 
deferral state, where the complainant has instituted proceedings with a 
state or local agency with authority to enforce statutes comparable to 
Title VII, the limitation period is extended to 300 days to permit 
processing by the nonfederal agency.21 Failure to meet these deadlines 
EEOC is authorized to file suits in federal court in situations where it is unable to secure nn 
acceptable conciliation agreement. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1988). 
15. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b) (1991). 
16. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b) (1991) (emphasis added). 
17. EEOC Form 283. 
18. EEOC Form 5. 
19. EEOC Form 5, the charge of discrimination, is considered to be verified under oath when 
it is sworn to or affirmed before a notary public or other authorized person or when the charging 
party signs the following statement which appears at the bottom of the form: "I declare under 
penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct." Under 28 U.S.C. § 1746 (1988), 
"[w]herever, under any law of the United States ••. any matter is required ••• to be ••• proved 
by the sworn •.• oath ••• in writing ••. such matter may, with like force and effect, be ••• proved 
by the unsworn •.• statement, in writing" of the preceding declaration. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.3(a) 
(Supp. 1992); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1746(2) (1988); see, e.g., EEOC v. World's Finest Chocolate, 
Inc., 701 F. Supp. 637, 639 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (holding that a signed but undated EEOC charge is 
valid because the "crucial aspect of the form •.. is that the person write his or her signature 
under penalty of perjury."). 
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(l) (Supp. 1992). 
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(l) (Supp. 1992). For an overview of the EEOC enforcement pro-
cedure, see SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 424-26. To be designated as a deferral or "706 
Agency," 
the State or political subdivision [must have] a fair employment practice law which makes 
unlawful employment practices based upon race, color, religion, sex, national origin or disa· 
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may render a claim invalid for purposes of administrative relief and 
therefore judicial relief as well. Although the Supreme Court_ has held 
that timely filing of a charge is not a jurisdictional requirement but 
rather akin to a statute of limitations,22 federal courts dismiss numer-
ous claims when plaintiffs, failing to comply with this procedural re-
quirement, offer explanations insufficient to toll the filing limitations 
period. 
Not surprisingly, plaintiffs confronted by motions to dismiss their 
claims for failure to file a timely charge have tried to rely on their 
intake questionnaires which often were filed within the limitations pe-
riod. 23 Such plaintiffs argue that the questionnaire should satisfy the 
filing requirement, with the subsequently filed charge of discrimination 
acting as an amendment which relates back under the EEOC's regula-
tions. 24 The validity of this argument turns on the question of whether 
a timely intake questionnaire that is verified after the limitations pe-
riod has run may satisfy the requirement to file a sworn charge within 
the statutory period, or whether the EEOC's regulations which permit 
subsequent verification exceed the authority granted by Title VII. 
This Note argues that the EEOC's interpretation of Title VII as 
reflected in its regulations is consistent with underlying statutory in-
tent and strikes an appropriate balance between the needs of employ-
ers and employees. Therefore, Congress should amend section 706(b) 
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to provide that a charge 
must be verified prior to the commencement of an EEOC investigation 
but not necessarily within the statutory filing period. Part I examines 
the legislative history of Title VII and its integrated procedures for 
obtaining administrative and judicial relief. Part II critiques the vari-
ous ways in which federal courts have attempted to resolve the conflict 
between the explicit oath requirement contained in the statute and the 
EEOC's implementing regulations which permit subsequent verifica-
tion of a lesser submission. Part III argues that Congress should 
amend the statute to coincide with the courts' movement toward a 
more flexible standard. This Note concludes that the purposes of Title 
VII would best be served by amending the statute to permit subse-
quent verification of timely filed intake questionnaires. 
bility [and must have] established a State or local authority •.. that is empowered with 
respect to employment practices found to be unlawful, to do one of three things: To grant 
relief from the practice; to seek relief from the practice; or to institute criminal proceedings 
with respect to the practice. 
29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.70(a)(l) & (2) (Supp. 1992). See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1988). 
22. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385, 386 (1982) ("Filing a timely charge of 
discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court, but a 
requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel and equitable 
tolling."). 
23. See infra Part II. 
24. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
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I. LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY HISTORY 
This Part examines relevant portions of Title VII's legislative and 
regulatory history and finds that although Congress institutionalized a 
preference for conciliation, the prerequisites to filing suit were not in-
tended to deter individuals from seeking judicial relief. In fact, a de-
tailed examination of the legislative history reveals that securing the 
right of an individual to pursue a claim in court was critical to Title 
VII's enactment. Section I.A demonstrates that Title VII was pre-
ceded by federal employment discrimination programs which relied on 
persuasion rather than judicial enforcement. This section also docu-
ments the concerted effort made by supporters of Title VII to ensure 
an individual claimant's ability to seek judicial relief when denied sat-
isfaction at the administrative level. Section I.B shows that Congress 
provided a private right of action as part of a compromise limiting the 
EEOC's role to that of a conciliator. Section I.C notes the lack of 
congressional attention paid to the oath requirement and the long 
existence of the EEOC's amendment policy and concludes that the 
verification requirement was perfunctory and subordinate to larger 
concerns. These legislative values and the goal of facilitating the 
processing of EEOC claims in a uniform and equitable manner pro-
vide a basis for evaluating the courts' varied interpretations of section 
706(b). 
A. The Fair Employment Practices Committees 
Prior to establishment of the EEOC in 1964, a series of presiden-
tially created committees studied and made recommendations regard-
ing the elimination of employment discrimination. 25 The initial 
impetus for the creation of the committees was a wartime labor 
shortage exacerbated by the refusal of employers to hire black work-
ers.26 The first Committee on Fair Employment Practices (FEPC), 
established in 1941 by executive order, was intended to "reaffirm[] 
[the] policy of full participation in the defense program by all persons, 
regardless of race, creed, color, or national origin."27 President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt authorized the five-member Committee on Fair 
Employment Practices to "receive and investigate complaints of dis-
crimination" and to "take appropriate steps to redress grievances."28 
His executive order also required the government to administer federal 
vocational training programs in a nondiscriminatory manner and to 
25. Belton, supra note 1, at 908-11. 
26. 90 CoNG. REc. A3033-34 (1944) (statement of Rep. Dawson) ("The labor situation got 
so acute that the war industries and the war movement were being retarded. The President, in 
his judgment, in order to meet a war situation, in order to cure or seek to cure a glaring wrong, 
appointed this Committee."). 
27. Exec. Order No. 8802, 6 Fed. Reg. 3109 (1941). 
28. Id. 
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include in all government contracts a provision prohibiting employ-
ment discrimination. Over the course of its five-year existence, the 
size and precise mission of the FEPC changed slightly, but it never 
wielded any enforcement power.29 Presidents Truman and Eisen-
hower continued these efforts in a more limited manner, creating by 
executive order committees to address problems of discrimination in 
government contracts. 30 
The Fair Employment Practices Committee of this era led to fur-
ther efforts by the federal government to regulate discriminatory em-
ployment practices. 31 Members of both the House and Senate of every 
Congress from 1943 to 1963 introduced bills to establish permanent 
nondiscrimination committees with varying degrees of enforcement 
power. 32 The battle over a bill introduced by Representative McCon-
29. A press release issued by the Southeastern Railroad Presidents' Conference illustrates the 
inability of the FEPC to obtain compliance: "Sixteen railroads and terminal companies today 
told the President's Committee on Fair Employment Practice, in a letter of response, that they 
cannot comply with the committee's directives •.. regarding the hiring and promoting of Negro 
railroad workers ..•. " 89 CoNG. REc. A5454 (1943) (remarks of Rep. John E. Rankin). The 
frustration of members of Congress was evident in remarks by Rep. Marcantonio regarding the 
Southeastern Presidents' Conference's decision not to honor Executive Order 8802. 
Instead of complying with an order which is in keeping with the war effort, instead of coop-
erating by using all available manpower, irrespective of race, creed, color, or national origin, 
these railroad companies have seen fit to send to this Congress a message misrepresenting 
what has been done and at the same time attacking the fundamental principles of democ-
racy, for which American men are fighting and dying all over the world. 
89 CoNG. REc. 10,656 (1943) .. See also 90 CoNG. REc. A3034 (1944) (statement of Rep. Daw-
son) ("Their only powers were those of persuasion."). But see 90 CoNG. REc. 6803, 6806 (1944) 
(statement of Sen. Russell regarding a transportation strike in Philadelphia precipitated by the 
union's assertion that compliance with an FEPC order to hire blacks as streetcar and motor-
coach operators violated its contract with the Philadelphia Transportation Company: 
They have asserted when before committees of Congress, and their sponsors have con-
tended, that they had no power to enforce their directives, except that of an advisory na-
ture .•.. When the F.E.P.C. press the button, they throw into action every agency of the 
Federal Government, from the War Manpower Commission to the armed might of the 
United States Army and the Navy.). 
30. See 16 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (1951); 18 Fed. Reg. 4899 (1953); 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (1961); see 
also Chambers & Goldstein, supra note 2, at 13 n.27. Ultimately, President Kennedy's Commit-
tee on Equal Employment Opportunity, which had a similar focus, gained enforcement powers 
including authority to publish the names of parties in noncompliance, recommend civil and crim-
inal actions by the Department of Justice, terminate the contracts of noncomplying employers, 
and prohibit entering into additional contracts with violators unless the party could show that 
the discriminatory policies no longer existed. EEOC LEGISLATIVE HisroRY, supra note 3, at 4. 
The Committee also administered a vast program to encourage voluntary cooperation under the 
title "plan for progress." Id. 
31. EEOC LEGISLATIVE HlsTORY, supra note 3, at 7. 
32. See, e.g., H.R. 3096, H.R. 3994, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941); H.R. 7412, 77th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1942); H.R. 1732, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943); S. 2048, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944); H.R. 
2232, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945); S. 101, S. 459, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945); H.R. 5216, 79th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1946); H.R. 2824, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947); S. 984, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1947); H.R. 4453, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949); S. 174, S. 1728, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949); H.R. 
6841, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950); H.R. 552, H.R. 2092, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); S. 551, 82d 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); S. 3368, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952); H.R. 647, H.R. 1253, 83d Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1953); S. 1, S. 692, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953); H.R. 3306, H.R. 3393, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1955); S. 899, 84th Cong. 1st Sess. (1955); H.R. 10,968, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956); H.R. 144, 
H.R. 3615, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957); S. 506, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957); H.R. 354, H.R. 908, 
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nell in the 81st Congress (1950) - the only antidiscrimination bill of 
this type to pass either house during this period - illustrates the con-
tentious nature of the enforcement issue. The McConnell bill would 
have established a permanent Fair Employment Practice Commission 
that relied solely on the dissemination of information, the provision of 
technical assistance, and voluntary conciliation to achieve its objective 
of eliminating "discrimination because of race, creed, or color in em-
ployment relations."33 In adopting this measure, the House rejected a 
stronger FEPC bill authored by future Education and Labor Commit-
tee Chairman Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. The Powell bill made it an 
"unlawful employment practice ... to refuse to hire, to discharge, or 
otherwise to discriminate" in the terms of employment on the basis of 
"race, color, religion, ancestry or national origin."34 The Powell bill 
also established a five-member FEPC to provide technical assistance 
and conciliation services and to receive and investigate individual 
charges of discrimination. Upon a finding of an unfair employment 
practice, the Commission would have had the power to issue cease and 
desist orders and to seek enforcement by the federal appellate courts. 
The House, not yet ready to create an enforcement mechanism against 
discriminatory employers, substituted the McConnell version for the 
more stringent Powell measure by a vote of 222 to 178.35 
In the Senate, neither the companion measure to the Powell bill, 
introduced by Senator McGrath, nor the House-passed version of the 
McConnell bill ever received consideration on the merits as the Senate 
failed to invoke cloture to end a filibuster of the FEPC bill. 36 In that 
setting, the question of enforcement power was among the most divi-
sive issues. Some Senators viewed an antidiscrimination commission 
with authority to compel employers to abide by equal employment op-
portunity guidelines as un-American.37 Following the Senate's failure 
86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); S. 1999, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); H.R. 104, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1961); s. 1258, S. 1819, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); H.R. 10,144, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962); 
H.R. 405, H.R. 3139, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); S. 1937, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1963); H.R. 
7152, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964); see also Francis J. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. 
INDUS. & CoM. L. REV. 431 (1966). 
33. H.R. 6841, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(b) (1950). 
34. H.R. 4453, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(a)(l) (1949) (as reported by the Committee on Edu-
cation and Labor on Aug. 2, 1949). 
35. 96 CoNG. REC. 2253 (1950). 
36. "The FEPC defeat came in the form of failure to adopt a proposal to limit debate on a 
motion to call up the FEPC bill. The vote was 52 for and 32 against. Since 64 favorable votes 
were needed to invoke cloture, this means that FEPC is dead for this session." Senate in Mourn-
ing, WASH. STAR, May 21, 1950 (editorial), reprinted in 96 CONG. REc. A3949 (1950) (remarks 
of Sen. Richard B. Russell). 
37. A radio debate between Sen. Humphrey, an FEPC supporter, and Sen. Holland, an oppo-
nent, was reprinted in the Congressional Record at the request of Sen. Eastland. In response to 
the question "Do you support and advocate a voluntary [FEPC]?", Senator Holland responded 
that "you can't ram this kind of thing in America down the throats of the great majority of the 
States . • . . [T]hose powers of compulsion are foreign to and incompatible with the American 
system of law." Senator Humphrey responded that the FEPC legislation "carries with it, as all 
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to invoke cloture, the Washington Star, in an editorial opposing a com-
pulsory FEPC, noted that "[n]o other issue had been so shot through 
with partisan politics as this one .... " 38 A New York Times editorial, 
on the other hand, emphasized that "some form of compulsion is re-
quired .... [C]ommon sense ... indicates that the enforcement agency 
should be able to fall back on legal sanctions if its efforts at persuasion 
fail. There is no tyrannical power here, unless Congress and the Fed-
eral courts be viewed as instruments of tyranny."39 This early debate 
foreshadowed disagreements that continue today. 
B. Judicial Enforcement as a Compromise 
Congress carried the strategy of attacking employment discrimina-
tion through conciliation and persuasion into the language of Title VII 
in 1964. In order to secure passage of an equal opportunity bill and 
avoid a filibuster in the Senate, supporters were forced to compro-
mise.40 The House Judiciary Committee reported an omnibus civil 
rights bill that included a title which established an Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission to receive, issue, and investigate 
charges of discrimination.41 Although the Commission could bring 
civil actions against violators, this option was available only after the 
Commission had failed to eliminate the discriminatory practice by "in-
formal methods of conference, conciliation and persuasion."42 As part 
of the trend toward limiting what opponents viewed as the potentially 
unchecked power of the new administrative agency,43 the House bill as 
reported adopted this scheme in lieu of the model reported by the 
House Education and Labor Committee, which would have provided 
the Commission direct enforcement power in the form of cease and 
desist orders.44 The full Judiciary Committee also rejected a proposal 
effective American law does, penalties for that recalcitrant antisocial minority which will not 
abide by the decision of the majority." 96 CoNG. REc. A3025, A3028 (1950). 
38. Senate in Mourning, supra note 36. 
39. The FEPC Bill, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1950 (editorial), reprinted in 96 CONG. REc. 
A5144-45 (1950) (remarks of Rep. Adam C. Powell, Jr.). 
40. [W]e are in a parliamentary situation where we do not dare adopt any amendment 
which has not received the categorical approval of Representative McCulloch. 
If we should do so, we might be forced to go to conference. If the House would not 
accept the Senate amendments, and if the bill went to conference - that is, if the House 
should let it go there, we would then be faced with the threat of a second filibuster. 
110 CoNG. REc. 7215 (1964) (statement of Sen. Clark), reprinted in EEOC LEGISLATIVE His-
TORY, supra note 3, at 3010. 
41. EEOC LEGlSLATIVE HlsrORY, supra note 3, at 9-10, 2011-13. 
42. H.R. 7152, §§ 707(a) & (b), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), 
reprinted in EEOC LEGlSLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 3, at 2001, 2012. 
43. Vaas, supra note 32, at 450-51 (referring to the "fear that the EEOC would develop into 
an extensive octopus like the NLRB"). 
44. HOUSE CoMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, ADDmONAL VIEWS OF HONORABLE GEORGE 
MEADER, H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), reprinted in EEOC LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY, supra note 3, at 2043, 2057; see also Vaas, supra note 32, at 435. 
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reported by one of its own subcommittees that would have vested en-
forcement authority in one half of a bifurcated EEOC.45 As indicated 
by committee member McCulloch: 
A substantial number of committee members ... preferred that the ulti-
mate determination of discrimination rest with the Federal judiciary. 
Through this requirement ... settlement of complaints w[ould] occur 
more rapidly and with greater frequency. In addition ... the employer 
or labor union w[ould] have a fairer forum to establish innocence .... 46 
Thus, the process of compromise regarding Title VII in the House was 
a movement toward curtailing the authority of the EEOC to act uni-
laterally against discriminatory employers.47 Although a Commission 
member was empowered to file a charge, and the Commission could 
investigate and evaluate the reasonableness of the allegations and seek 
conciliation, it would not have the power to adjudicate the complaint 
and implement a remedy. Instead, the federal courts were designated 
as the fairer, more appropriate arbiters on the sensitive question of 
employment discrimination. 
In the Senate, the House-passed omnibus civil rights bill was the 
subject of extended procedural and substantive wrangling. Concur-
rent with the Senate's debate on the bill, a. bipartisan cadre of its sup-
porters worked with the Department of Justice and key House 
members to reach an acceptable compromise. These negotiations re-
sulted in a pair of substitute amendments offered by Senators Mans-
field and Dirksen.48 Described as "the most basic and far-reaching of 
all the Senate amendments,"49 the revisions in the enforcement provi-
sions further restricted the EEOC's role in ensuring compliance with 
the antidiscrimination law. The amendment eliminated the EEOC's 
ability to obtain court enforcement except when there was a pattern or 
45. "The subcommittee bill called for procedures before the newly created [EEO] board, 
followed by judicial review by the district courts • • • • The full committee substitute calls for 
proceedings by the Commission in the U.S. district courts •••• " HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICI-
ARY, MINORITY REPORT UPON PROPOSED C!vIL RIGHTS Ac:r OF 1963, H.R. REP. No. 914, 
88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), reprinted in EEOC LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 3, at 2062, 
2087. 
46. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, AoomONAL VIEWS OF HONORABLE WILLIAM M. 
McCULLOCH ET AL., H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2 (1963), reprinted in EEOC 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 3, at 2122, 2150. 
47. For a view that this process was less one of compromise and more an exercise of sheer 
political power, see HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, AoomONAL INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF 
HONORABLE WILLIAM c. CRAMER ON H.R. 7152, H. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1963), reprinted in EEOC LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 3, at 2114, 2117 ("No purpose 
would be here served by a recitation of how the 'compromise' was drafted or who participated in 
it. Although I was a member of the subcommittee that considered the matter for months, I was 
not invited to participate nor was I informed of its contents until 10:30 p.m. when a Justice 
Department messenger delivered my copy on the Monday before the Tuesday meeting."). 
48. Amend. No. 656, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 110 CONG. REc. 11,926 (1964); Amend. No. 
1052, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 110 CONG. REc. 13,310 (1964); see also Vaas, supra note 32, at 445· 
46. 
49. Vaas, supra note 32, at 452. 
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practice of resistance by an employer. In cases of individualized dis-
crimination, the agency could do no more than seek conciliation. so 
As congressional compromise diminished the EEOC's ability to se-
cure compliance from violators, there was a concomitant increase in 
the individual complainant's role in enforcement. To assuage the con-
cerns of critics who feared an EEOC with little accountability, legisla-
tors virtually eliminated the Commission from the enforcement 
process. Still requiring some enforcement mechanism to gain support 
from members of Congress who favored a strong EEOC, the negotia-
tors deposited the burden of enforcement squarely on the complain-
ant. 51 As part of the deal, procedures to facilitate claimants' ability to 
enforce their rights were added to the Senate bill. The bill authorized 
courts to appoint an attorney to represent the party aggrieved, to per-
mit commencement of the action " 'without payment of fees, costs, or 
security,' " and to grant the prevailing party a reasonable attorney's 
fee and costs. 52 In addition, the Senate struck the House requirement 
that an individual obtain permission from one Commissioner to pro-
ceed in court. 
As one commentator has noted, "[t]he most significant feature of 
the Title VII enforcement scheme is that it lodges the formal power of 
adjudication exclusively in the courts, rather than giving quasi-judicial 
power to an administrative agency."53 Furthermore, as part of the 
final compromise, in individual cases only the person aggrieved may 
utilize this judicial enforcement mechanism; no one may sue on that 
person's behalf. Certainly such a scheme was not the first choice of 
either the opponents of Title VII, who would have preferred a strictly 
50. A staff member of the Senate Judiciary Committee summarized the change in a 
memorandum: 
The Senate amendment struck out the power of the [EEOC] to enforce this title of the bill in 
court suits .... Its function now is limited to an attempt at voluntary conciliation of alleged 
unlawful practices • • . • Under the Senate amendment only an aggrieved person can bring 
suit against an employer unless there is a pattern or practice of resistance • . • . The Com-
mission cannot institute suit at all. 
110 CoNG. REc. 14,331 (1964) quoted in, Vaas, supra note 32, at 452. 
51. George Rutherglen, Title VII Class Actions, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 688, 691 (1980). 
This allocation of enforcement powers among administrative proceedings, public actions, 
and private suits was the result of a series of compromises that steadily diluted the power of 
the EEOC to prosecute and decide cases, and steadily strengthened the power of private 
individuals to sue and of federal judges to adjudicate. 
Id. at 692. 
52. Vaas, supra note 32, at 453. These provisions were "part of the price which had to be 
paid to secure bipartisan agreement on striking out the power of the EEOC to enforce Title VII 
by court action." Id. at 454; see Comment, Enforcement of Fair Employment Under the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 430, 433 (1965) ("The leadership compromise completed 
the attenuation of the Commission by divesting it of all enforcement power and denying it access 
to the courts, but in return every grievant was granted the opportunity to seek redress in the 
federal courts."). For a discussion of the anticipated impact of provision of attorney's fees, see R. 
Wayne Walker, Title VII: Complaint and Enforcement Procedures and Relief and Remedies, 7 
B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REV. 495, 501-06 (1966). 
53. Walker, supra note 52, at 495 (footnotes omitted). 
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voluntary employment discrimination plan, or of the proponents, who 
might have opted for a strong EEOC with authority to adjudicate 
claims and issue cease and desist orders. Nevertheless, the individual's 
ability to press his or her claim in court was central to the reaching of 
a ceasefire in the 534-hour Senate battle over the bill54 and ultimately 
to passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. As the linchpin in this 
elaborate compromise, preservation of complainants' access to court 
remains a central tenet of Title VII and must be borne in mind even as 
the statute is interpreted almost three decades later. 
C. "In Writing Under Oath" 
In contrast to the extensive legislative history documenting the 
evolution of the Title VII enforcement provisions, the information 
available regarding the impetus for the section 706(a) requirement that 
a charge of discrimination be submitted "in writing under oath"55 is 
sparse. Fair Employment Practices legislation introduced prior to 
1948 utilized language such as "[w]henever it is alleged,"56 
"[w]henever the committee has reason to believe,"57 or "[w]henever it 
is charged"58 to describe the manner in which enforcement proceed-
ings would be initiated. In 1947, however, members of the 80th Con-
gress introduced changes in the language in FEPC bills to require that 
a charge be filed under oath. First included in a bill introduced by 
Senator Ives of New York on March 27, 1947,59 members of Congress 
carried this concept forward through the intervening sixteen years60 
and utilized it in Title VII as enacted. 
54. "After 534 hours, one minute and thirty-seven seconds, the Senate voted cloture." 
Chambers & Goldstein, supra note 2, at 12. 
55. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706(a), reprinted in EEOC LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra 
note 3, at 1011 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1988)). 
56. S. 101, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. § 10(b) (1945). 
57. H.R. 1732, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5.2 (1943). 
58. S. 2048, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. § 10(b) (1944). 
59. S. 984, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(a) (1947). 
60. See, e.g., H.R. 4453, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(b) (1949) ("[w]henever a sworn written 
charge has been filed"); S. 174, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(a) (1949) (same); S. 1728, 81st Cong., 1st 
Sess. § 7(b) (1949) (same); H.R. 552, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(b) (1951) (same); H.R. 2092, 82d 
Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(a) (1951) (same); S. 551, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(a) (1951) (same); S. 3368, 
82d Cong., 2d Sess. § 7(b) (1952) (same); H.R. 647, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(b) (1953) (same): 
H.R. 1253, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(b) (1953) (same); S. 692, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(b) (1953) 
(same); H.R. 3306, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(a) (1955) (same): H.R. 3393, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 
§ 7(b) (1955) (same); S. 899, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(b) (1955) (same): H.R. 1096, 84th Cong., 
2d Sess. § 7(b) (1956) (same); H.R. 144, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(b) (1957) (same); H.R. 3615, 
85th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(b) (1957) (same); S. 506, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(b) (1957) (same); 
H.R. 354, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(b) (1959) (same); H.R. 908, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(b) 
(1959) (same); S. 1999, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(b) (1959) (same); H.R. 104, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 
§ 7(b) (1961) (same); S. 1258, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(b) (1961) (same); S. 1819, 87th Cong., 1st 
Sess. § 7(b) (1961) (same); H.R. 10144, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. § 9(a) (1962) ("[w]henever it is 
charged in writing under oath"); H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 707(a} (1963) (as reported 
with amendments by House Committee on the Judiciary) (same). 
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The source of the oath requirement appears to have been the New 
York state FEPC law with which Senator Ives had been strongly asso-
ciated as a member of the New York State Assembly and upon which 
he had modeled his Senate legislation.61 The New York "Law Against 
Discrimination," which was enacted in 1945, created a state agency 
"with power to eliminate and prevent discrimination in employment 
because of race, creed, color or national origin."62 Under the New 
York law, "[a]ny person claiming to be aggrieved by an alleged unlaw-
ful employment practice may ... make, sign and file with the commis-
sion a verified complaint in writing."63 The adoption of the oath from 
the New York law was likely in response to objections by opponents of 
a fair employment bill in the 79th Congress that authorized a Fair 
Employment Practice Commission to act "[w]henever it is alleged that 
any person has engaged in any such unfair employment practice."64 
During a filibuster of that bill, Senator Olin Johnston of South Caro-
lina, after quoting this section of the bill, commented: "Senators will 
notice the word 'alleged.' When newspapers start to say something 
about me down home which they might not be able to prove, they just 
start by saying, 'It is alleged that Olin Johnston did so and so.' ... It is 
easy to allege something."65 In the following Congress, when the 
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare reported Senator Ives' bill, 
the report stated: 
Critics of earlier legislation prohibiting discrimination in employment 
laid much stress on the alleged procedural weaknesses of those bills. S. 
984 seeks to provide every possible protection for those coming under its 
jurisdiction. . . . 
. . . [I]t sets up safeguards against irresponsible complaints by limit-
ing the period within which complaints may be filed [and] by requiring 
that a sworn written charge be filed . . . . 66 
From these sparse legislative clues, it appears that Senator Ives in-
cluded the oath requirement to preclude opponents from raising the 
specter of frivolous claims. Because Senator Johnston did not offer 
any evidence that the complaint process had been misused under ex-
isting state FEPC laws, it is uncertain whether this objection was 
raised out of genuine concern or as a simple political diversion. It is 
similarly unclear whether legislators considered the oath requirement 
an essential aspect of the Commission's administrative procedures or 
61. "The FEPC law in New York is better known as the Ives-Quinn law, bearing the name of 
that fine Republican gentleman, Irvin Ives, who was since elected junior United States Senator 
from the State of New York ••.. " 94 CoNG. REc. 9532 (1948) (statement of Rep. Multer). 
62. Law Against Discrimination, ch. 118, § 125, 1945 N.Y. Laws 457, 458. 
63. Law Against Discrimination, ch. 118, § 132, 1945 N.Y. Laws 457, 461. 
64. S. 101, 19th Cong., 1st Sess. § lO(b) (1945) (emphasis added). 
65. 92 CoNG. REC. 395 (1946). 
66. S. REP. No. 951, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1948). 
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instead viewed it as an expedient and seemingly harmless way of 
quashing one of the many criticisms produced by FEPC opponents. 
The inclusion of a requirement that a charge be filed under oath 
was carried over from this early legislation to most subsequent FEPC 
legislation. Although commentators have noted that "[s]eldom has 
similar legislation been debated with greater consciousness of the need 
for 'legislative history,' or with greater care in the making thereof, to 
guide the courts in interpreting and applying the law,''67 nothing in 
the congressional debates over Title VII indicates the significance of 
the oath requirement. 
On July 29, 1966, the EEOC first promulgated regulations that 
some courts68 perceive as conflicting with the oath requirement con-
tained in the language of the Title VII statute. 69 The relevant regula-
tions permit submission of timely unsworn complaints provided that 
claimants subsequently verify them. "The purpose of this amendment 
[to the Title VII regulations] is to describe more clearly the present 
Commission policy with respect to the filing and amendment of 
charges .... "70 Evidently, the EEOC had consistently accepted sub-
sequently verified unsworn complaints as valid charges since the enact-
ment of Title VII. This regulation has been operative since 
promulgated and Congress has never required the EEOC to conform 
to the apparent statutory requirement that charges be filed in writing 
under oath. 
Examination of relevant parts of Title VIl's lengthy legislative his-
tory reveals a movement from efforts to encourage voluntary compli-
ance with nondiscrimination laws to a system which mandates equal 
employment opportunity. At the same time, the Act's enforcement 
procedures shifted away from a soon-to-be-established administrative 
agency and into the hands of the judiciary. In the end, Congress cre-
ated an agency obligated to protect the right to a discrimination-free 
workplace but wholly lacking the power necessary to effectuate this 
policy. This system could function only if the drafters expected dissat-
isfied complainants - private litigants - to shoulder much of the 
burden of enforcing Title VII. 11 
67. Vaas, supra note 32, at 444. Because the House·passed bill, H.R. 7152, was not referred 
to a Senate Committee, there was no Senate report or opportunity to clarify troubling provisions; 
therefore legislative history created during floor debate was particularly important in expressing 
the Senate's intent regarding the bill. 
68. See infra section II.A. 
69. 31 Fed. Reg. 10,269 (1966). 
70. Id. 
71. Note, Protection from Employer Retaliation: A Suggested Analysis for Section 704(a), 65 
VA. L. REv. 1155, 1155 n.2 and accompanying text (1979) ("Title VII places major responsibil-
ity for enforcing compliance with its policies, through either formal or informal conciliation, on 
the individual complainant."). 
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II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE OATH REQUIREMENT 
With varying degrees of success, the federal courts have grappled 
with the problem of reconciling the language of Title VII and the 
EEOC's regulations. This Part describes and critiques the three ap-
proaches that the federal courts have taken in interpreting the section 
706(b) oath requirement when that interpretation is determinative of 
whether an individual may pursue her claim in court. 72 Section II.A 
discusses those courts that have given no weight to the EEOC's regu-
lations and have instead strictly enforced the statutory oath require-
ment. Section II.B examines the increasing number of courts that 
emphasize the remedial nature of Title VII by treating an intake ques-
tionnaire as a valid charge for the purposes of fulfilling the filing limi-
tations period. Section II.C analyzes a final group of courts that view 
an intake questionnaire as sufficient to meet the timely filing require-
ment if the EEOC treats the questionnaire in the manner it would a 
valid charge. Section 11.D concludes that the second group of deci-
sions, which has adopted the "Remedial Approach,"73 best serves the 
goals of Title VII. 
A. No Oath, No Charge 
The Fourth Circuit and some district courts of Massachusetts, Vir-
ginia, and Illinois have held that section 706(b )'s requirement that 
charges be filed in writing under oath "is cast in mandatory terms"74 
and therefore an unswom intake questionnaire is insufficient to satisfy 
the filing limitations period. While offering differing rationales for 
their unwillingness to examine the language of the statute more than 
superficially, each court applied the provision in a mechanical fashion 
without regard to important underlying goals of Title VII. In EEOC 
v. Appalachian Power Co., 75 an EEOC Commissioner filed a charge 
without obtaining verification. 76 The district court dismissed the case 
on the ground that the unswom charge was invalid and thus the 
72. See 4 Empl. Discrimination Coordinator (Research Inst. Am.), 1146,245 (Apr. 16, 1991) 
(describing the split among courts on treatment of subsequently verified intake questionnaires). 
73. See infra section 11.B. 
74. EEOC v. Appalachian Power Co., 568 F.2d 354, 355 (4th Cir. 1978). 
75. 568 F.2d 354 (4th Cir. 1978). 
76. Although this case involved a charge filed by a Commissioner rather than one filed by a 
private plaintiff, the reasoning is relevant because the 1972 amendments to Title VII extended the 
oath requirement to the Commission. Prior to the 1972 amendments, the statute authorized a 
Commissioner to file a charge of discrimination only when "he has reasonable cause to believe a 
violation of this title has occurred." Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706(a), 78 
Stat. 241, 259 (amended 1972). The 1972 amendments eliminated this distinction between Com-
mission charges and private charges. As interpreted by the Supreme Court in EEOC v. Shell Oil 
Co., 466 U.S. 54, 76 (1984), "[t]he only plausible explanation for that change is that Congress 
wished to place a Commissioner on the same footing as an aggrieved private party: neither was 
held to any prescribed level of objectively verifiable suspicion at the outset of the enforcement 
procedure." 
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EEOC and the court lacked jurisdiction. 77 Rejecting an examination 
of legislative history, the district court stated "the language [of the 
statute] is plain and unambiguous," and indicated that "to dilute the 
oath requirement and hold it only directory ... would be tantamount 
to ignoring the congressional language."78 The Fourth Circuit af-
firmed the dismissal. 79 
By truncating its analysis at this point, the Appalachian Power 
court ignored an emerging body of law holding that Title VII should 
be liberally interpreted to effectuate an underlying policy of nondis-
crimination. As stated by the Fifth Circuit: 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act provides a clear mandate from Con-
gress that no longer will the United States tolerate this form of discrimi-
nation. It is, therefore, the duty of the courts to make sure that the Act 
works, and the intent of Congress is not hampered by a combination of a 
strict construction of the statute and a battle with semantics. 80 
Subsequent to Appalachian Power, the Supreme Court repeatedly em-
phasized that Title VII should be construed broadly to carry out con-
gressional intent to eradicate employment discrimination.81 Rather 
than seeking to interpret the statutory language to effectuate congres-
sional goals82 or relying on the EEOC's regulations, the Appalachian 
77. EEOC v. Appalachian Power Co., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1294, 1295-96 (W.D. 
Va. 1976). This case occurred prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Zipes v. Trans World 
Airlines, 455 U.S. 385 (1982), which established that the filing of a valid, timely charge is not a 
jurisdictional requirement but instead operates like a statute of limitations which is subject to 
equitable tolling. 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982). The reasoning of the court remains relevant because 
post-Zpes courts have applied it in dismissing cases (though not on jurisdictional grounds). 
78. Appalachian Power Co., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1295. 
79. EEOC v. Appalachian Power Co., 568 F.2d 354, 355 (4th Cir. 1978). 
80. Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888, 891 (5th Cir. 1970), quoted in Douglas 
A. Schaaf, Title VII - Timely Filing Requirement in Deferral States ls Satisfied When the Initial 
Complaint Is Received by the EEOC Within the 300-Day Limitation of 706(e}, 55 NOTRE DAME 
LAW. 396, 405 n.44 (1980); see also Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522 (1972); Chambers & 
Goldstein, supra note 2, at 14 n.36 and accompanying text ("In short, the courts treated Title VII 
as a broad remedial statute designed to change fundamentally the patterns of employment dis· 
crimination which had become ossified in the labor market."). But cf. Baldwin County Welcome 
Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 150 (1984) (holding that there is "no satisfactory basis for giving 
Title VII actions a special status under the [Federal] Rules of Civil Procedure"). 
81. See, e.g., Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385, 398 (1982) ("[W]e honor the 
remedial purpose of the legislation as a whole without negating the particular purpose of the 
filing requirement, to give prompt notice to the employer."); Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 
807, 818 (1980) ("It is unquestionably true that the 1964 statute was enacted to implement the 
congressional policy against discriminatory employment practices, and that that basic policy 
must inform construction of this remedial legislation.") (footnote omitted). 
82. In Love v. Pullman, 404 U.S. 522 (1972), the Supreme Court approved an EEOC proce-
dure whereby after receiving a written charge, the EEOC orally referred it to a state agency, 
"and then formally filed once the state agency indicated that it would decline to take action," 
without the benefit of an additional written charge. 404 U.S. at 525. The Court, in an effort to 
provide broad coverage, reasoned that nothing in the statutory language precluded the interpre-
tation advanced by the plaintiff: "Nothing in [Title VII] suggests that the state proceedings may 
not be initiated by the EEOC acting on behalf of the complainant rather than by the complainant 
himself, nor is there any requirement that the complaint to the state agency be made in writing 
rather than by oral referral." 404 U.S. at 525. The same reasoning could have been applied in 
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Power court enforced the statute in a formalistic manner. 
Turning a similarly deaf ear to the Supreme Court's statements 
that Title VII be liberally construed, the district court of Massachu-
setts, in Hamel v. Prudential Insurance Co., 83 rejected the plaintiff's 
argument that a timely filed intake questionnaire was adequate to pre-
serve her right to file in court, stating that "[a]ny suggestion that th[e] 
distinction [between an unswom intake questionnaire and a charge 
filed under oath] is formalistic tends to ignore the significance of a 
perjury conviction."84 By use of the inflammatory term perjury, the 
court shifted the focus of Title VII from protecting employees from 
discrimination to protecting employers from employees and employees 
from themselves. The court ignored longstanding EEOC regulations 
that provide for verification of a charge subsequent to its filing, thus 
reducing the risk of perjury while preserving the victim's cause of ac-
tion. After rejecting several other arguments, 85 the Hamel court 
granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. Sensitive to the 
disproportionately severe consequences of its rigid interpretation of Ti-
tle VII, the court defensively commented that "[q]uestions of 'techni-
cality' go to enactment, not interpretation."86 This :finger-pointing, 
however, did little to mask the fact that the court declined to follow 
the Supreme Court's lead in interpreting Title VII in light of its under-
lying goals. Instead, the court seemed to indicate it would interpret 
the statute literally until Congress made explicit its apparent intent 
that the oath requirement, like the rest of Title VII, be liberally 
construed. 
The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois has taken a 
similarly rigid approach. In a series of cases with influence outside the 
Seventh Circuit, 87 most notably Proffit v. Keycom Electronic Publish-
Appalachian Power because§ 706(b) does not indicate when in the filing process a charge must be 
verified. 
83. 640 F. Supp. 103 (D. Mass. 1986). 
84. Hamel. 640 F. Supp. at 105. 
85. The court rejected the plaintiff's claim that the filing period should be equitably tolled 
due to administrative error and delay by the EEOC in sending her the charge. Noting that the 
plaintiff was represented by counsel and that she had waited seven months before completing an 
intake questionnaire, the court determined that tolling would be inappropriate, though it might 
have been proper if plaintiff had proceeded pro se. 640 F. Supp. at 105. The court also found 
that even if the intake questionnaire were deemed a charge, the claim would not have been timely 
due to the failure to file with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, a prerequi-
site for obtaining the 300-day federal filing period. 640 F. Supp. at 105-07. 
86. 640 F. Supp. at 107. 
87. See, e.g., Sparkman v. Combined Intl., 690 F. Supp. 723 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Proffit v. 
Keycom Elec. Publishing, 625 F. Supp. 400 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Austin v. Russell County Sch. Bd., 
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1749, 1750 (W.D. Va. 1990) (citing Sparkman in support of the 
statement that "a signed intake questionnaire is not a writing under oath"); Graf v. K-Mart 
Corp., 50 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1370, 1373 n.5 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (citing Proffit for the 
proposition that "an intake questionnaire is not the same as an EEOC charge"); Buffington v. 
General Time Corp., 677 F. Supp. 1186, 1193 (M.D. Ga. 1988) (relying on Proffit for the propo-
sition that a "[q]uestionnaire does not constitute a sufficient 'charge' "); Hamel v. Prudential Ins. 
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ing 88 and Sparkman v. Combined International, 89 several judges of the 
district court for the Northern District of Illinois have explicitly re-
jected the EEOC's regulations permitting subsequent verification of a 
timely intake questionnaire, finding that they exceed the authority of 
the underlying statute.9° Faced with a situation in which the individ-
ual employee plaintiff filed a claim ten days after the statute had run, 
even though the EEOC had sent her the charge for signature more 
than two months earlier, the Proffit court stated that if the plaintiff 
had acted promptly, it might have been more inclined to "stretch the 
meaning of a 'charge' to include an Intake Questionnaire."91 In 
Sparkman, EEOC employees wrongly led the plaintiff to believe her 
questionnaire was sufficient to initiate formal proceedings. The court, 
while noting the harsh result of its decision, seemed to agree with the 
Proffit court that the Title VII statute "gives [the] EEOC the power to 
prescribe [only] the informational content and form of the sworn 
charge,"92 stating that "'implementing regulations or administrative 
procedures cannot override their authorizing statute.' " 93 Thus, the 
regulations permitting amendment were unenforceable and a subse-
quently filed sworn charge was ineffective to rescue her claim. 
The application of the Proffit reasoning to the Sparkman facts 
demonstrates one shortcoming of this formalistic interpretation of the 
section 706(b) oath provision. Proffit, while establishing a rule that 
the EEOC's regulations are unenforceable, implied that on different 
facts it might react more sympathetically. The Sparkman court, faced 
with such sympathetic facts, strictly applied the Proffit ruling and de-
clined to address the merits of the claim. Neither case accounts for 
the remedial intent of Title VII or acknowledges the deference argua-
bly due the EEOC's regulations.94 Although the Seventh Circuit re-
Co., 640 F. Supp. 103, 105 (D. Mass. 1986). The Hamel court approved of the statement in 
Proffit that Casavantes v. California State Univ., Sacramento, 732 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1984), see 
infra notes 115-18 and accompanying text, is "unpersuasive and another hard case making bad 
law." 
88. 625 F. Supp. 400 (N.D. Ill. 1985). 
89. 690 F. Supp. 723 (N.D. Ill. 1988). 
90. See Mason v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 46 Fair. Empt. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1310, 1312 
(N.D. Ill. 1987) ("[E]ven if the EEOC considered the Intake Questionnaire to be a charge, the 
EEOC has no authority to dispense with the statutorily mandated oath."); Sparkman, 690 F. 
Supp. at 724) ("[I]rrespective of EEOC's administrative view of the intake questionnaire, it does 
not satisfy the controlling statutory definition.") (quoting Proffit, 625 F. Supp. at 403); Proffit, 
625 F. Supp. at 403 ("First, of course, there is the fundamental principle that implementing 
regulations or administrative procedures cannot override their authorizing statute."); see also 
Ferch v. Syncor Intl. Corp., 56 Fair Empt. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 876 (N.D. Ill. 1990). 
91. Proffit, 625 F. Supp. at 405. 
92. Proffit, 625 F. Supp. at 403. 
93. Sparkman, 690 F. Supp. at 724 (quoting Proffit, 625 F. Supp. at 403). 
94. See EEOC v. Commercial Office Prods. Co., 486 U.S. 107, 115 (1988) ("[I]t is axiomatic 
that the EEOC's interpretation of Title VII, for which it has primary enforcement responsibility, 
need not be the best one . . . • Rather, the EEOC's interpretation of ambiguous language need 
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cently rejected the position taken by its district courts,9s whether this 
rejection will diminish the attractiveness of their reasoning to courts 
outside the Seventh Circuit that previously had adopted the Northern 
District of Illinois' position96 remains to be seen. 
A more flexible interpretation of the oath requirement need not 
undermine congressional concern for protecting employers from frivo-
lous or' untimely claims. For instance, the District Court for the West-
ern District of Virginia granted defendant's motion for snmmacy 
judgment in Austin v. Russell County School Board. 97 The plaintiff in 
Austin failed to file a timely charge even though the EEOC repeatedly 
informed her that her intake questionnaire and correspondence were 
insufficient to initiate proceedings against her former employer. 
Although the EEOC sent the plaintiff a confidential affidavit which 
would have functioned as her sworn statement, she never returned it.98 
Further, the court's opinion suggests that she never submitted any 
type of sworn document.99 In refusing to treat the signed question-
naire as a formal charge, the court cited Appalachian Power, Hamel, 
and Sparkman, and stated that it declined to "encourage such blatant 
disregard for the law as exercised by the plaintiff."100 Fmding further 
that the plaintiff's employer did not mislead her as to the cause of her 
discharge, the court rejected her claim that the filing period should be 
tolled. A policy permitting subsequent verification, as allowed by the 
EEOC's regulations, would not save a claimant in this situation. Title 
VII clearly demands that a claimant ultiriiately swear to a charge and 
on these facts the court's expressed concern is valid. The strict rule it 
applied, however, may be misused if a clearer policy or rule is not 
articulated. 
These courts, categorized as the "No Oath, No Charge" group, fail 
to accommodate the dominant view that Title VII be liberally con-
strued in favor of alleged victims of employment discrimination.101 
Both the Supreme Court and its observers have arrived at the conclu-
only be reasonable to be entitled to deference."); see also Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984); Udall v. Tallman, 3&0 U.S. 1, 16 (1965). 
95. The district court decisions hold that the statute requires that n complaint be in writing 
and under oath or affirmation before it can be considered n chnrge for purposes of Title Vll. 
Therefore, those courts have held that the EEOC is exceeding the nuthorily or the statute in 
allowing a written statement to constitute a charge for purposes or the time 00.r before the 
statement is verified by oath or affirmation. ••• We ••• hold that nn intake qucstiorumirc 
which is later verified may be sufficient to constitute a chnrge in some circumstnnces. 
Philbin v. General Elee. Capital Auto Lease, Inc., 929 F.2d 321, 323 (7th Cir. 1991) (emphasis 
added). Philbin is discussed at greater length in section ILC. See infra notes 128-30 nnd nccom-
panying text. 
96. See cases cited supra note 87. 
97. 53 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1749 (W.D. Va. 1990). 
98. Austin, 53 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1749. 
99. 53 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1750. 
100. 53 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1750. 
101. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text. 
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sion that Title VII is to be interpreted in a flexible manner to facilitate 
the congressional goal of "assur[ing] equality of employment opportu-
nities" and "eliminat[ing] ... discriminatory practices and devices." 102 
This underlying belief has led the courts to opt repeatedly for a less 
technical interpretation of the statute's intricate filing procedures. The 
Supreme Court noted in Love v. Pullman Co. 103 that "technicalities are 
particularly inappropriate in a statutory scheme in which laymen, 
unassisted by trained lawyers, initiate the process."104 In light of these 
firm statements that Title VII is "a remedial statute to be liberally 
construed in favor of the victims of discrimination,"105 an interpreta-
tion that would bar a claim because it was signed but unverified at the 
time of filing is too exacting. The filing procedure should comply with 
the intent of the Act106 rather than serve only the letter of the law. 
Furthermore, an interpretation that unduly inhibits the ability of com-
plainants to pursue their claims in court undermines the private en-
forcement component of Title VII, which was essential to the 
compromise that ultimately led to its enactment.107 
B. The Remedial Approach 
In stark contrast to the approach taken by the courts discussed in 
section II.A, a second group of courts represented by the Fifth, 108 
Sixth, 109 Ninth, and Tenth Circuits has relied on the underlying reme-
dial intent of Title VII by permitting plaintiffs who filed timely intake 
questionnaires to pursue their claims in court despite verification sub-
sequent to the expiration of the filing limitations period. In an early 
case, Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 110 the Fifth 
Circuit noted: 
"The legislative history is silent on the requisites of the charge .... It is 
in keeping with the purpose of the Act to keep the procedures for initiat-
ing action simple. . . . All that is required is that it give sufficient infor-
mation to enable EEOC to see what the grievance is all about."111 
The court reasoned further that the purpose of the procedural require-
102. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973). 
103. 404 U.S. 522 (1972). 
104. Love, 404 U.S. at 527. 
105. Mahroom v. Hook, 563 F.2d 1369, 1375 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 904 
(1978). 
106. See Love, 404 U.S. at 525 (1972) (holding that the filing procedure followed fully com-
plied with the intent of the Act). 
107. See supra section I.B. 
108. The Fifth Circuit subsequently shifted its reasoning from relying exclusively on the re· 
medial intent of Title VII to an approach that also considers the EEOC's treatment of the unveri· 
fied charge. See infra notes 131-32 and accompanying text. 
109. See infra note 112 and accompanying text. 
110. 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969). 
111. Weeks, 408 F.2d at 231 (quoting Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 30 n.3 (5th 
Cir. 1968)). 
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ments is to protect employers from frivolous charges and that such 
protection is provided because "unswom charges are not served upon 
respondents and . . . the investigation does not commence until a 
sworn charge is served."112 The Weeks court recognized the impor-
tance of keeping procedures for initiating action simple in a setting in 
which complainants typically will proceed pro se.113 The court also 
recognized Congress' competing interests in facilitating resolution of 
employment discrimination claims and protecting employers from un-
founded claims.114 
In Casavantes v. California State University, Sacramento, 115 the 
Ninth Circuit relied heavily on the proposition that " '[t]he Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Act is a remedial statute.' " 116 It concluded 
that the plaintiff's intake questionnaire filed 248 days after the alleged 
discriminatory act, "in the context of both the amendment procedures 
and the liberality to be ascribed to the procedural requirements, is suf-
ficient to constitute a charge."117 The court noted further that the 
completed intake questionnaire provided sufficient information to 
meet the requirements of the EEOC's regulations which allow for sub-
sequent amendment and verification. Acknowledging the need to bal-
ance the interests of employers with those of the claimants, the court 
stated that "[t]he charge intake process is principally designed to facil-
itate the processing of valid charges while screening out invalid 
charges at the earliest possible time."118 
To achieve both goals identified by the Casavantes court, the larg-
est reasonable number of charges should be permitted to reach the 
investigation stage because it is the earliest point at which the validity 
of most claims may be assessed. Requiring an oath significantly earlier 
than the investigation stage prematurely narrows the complaint intake 
funnel and needlessly screens out valid claims. 
The Tenth Circuit, in Peterson v. City of Wichita, 119 relied heavily 
on EEOC implementing regulations that permit amendment of a 
charge "to cure technical defects or omissions, including failure to ver-
ify the charge."120 The court stated that "the EEOC's interpretation 
112. 408 F.2d at 231. The Sixth Circuit employed similar reasoning in Blue Bell Boots, Inc. 
v. EEOC, 418 F.2d 355, 357 (6th Cir. 1969). The court concluded that congressional intent that 
verification of charges prevent harassment of employers by reckless charges may be served by 
requiring verification prior to EEOC action, but after the statutory filing period has run. See also 
EEOC v. Dillard Dept. Stores, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 1247, 1252 (W.D. Tenn. 1991). 
113. 408 F.2d at 231. 
114. 408 F.2d at 231. 
115. 732 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1984). 
116. Casavantes, 732 F.2d at 1442 (quoting Mahroom v. Hook, 563 F.2d 1369, 1375 (9th Cir. 
1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 904 (1978)). 
117. 732 F.2d at 1443. 
118. 732 F.2d at 1442. 
119. 888 F.2d 1307 (10th Cir. 1989). 
120. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b) (1988), cited in Peterson, 888 F.2d at 1308. 
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of Title VII is entitled to deference if it is reasonable."121 Ultimately, 
like the Casavantes court, the Tenth Circuit concluded that "the regu-
lation does not frustrate the purpose of the verification requirement, 
which is to protect an employer from frivolous claims, because the 
EEOC does not proceed to investigate a charge until it is verified."122 
This Remedial Approach, adopted by a number of circuits, 123 pays 
appropriate deference to the well-recognized congressional intent to 
eradicate employment discrimination. As Justice O'Connor has in-
structed, deference to the EEOC's interpretation of its authorizing 
statute is proper when "technical issue[s] of agency procedure" 
arise. 124 In addition, unlike the No Oath, No Charge group, this posi-
tion seeks to strike a balance between the goal of affording broad relief 
under Title VII and the competing need to protect employers from 
unnecessary, frivolous claims. Congress should strengthen this posi-
tion further by amending the statute to coincide explicitly with the 
EEOC's regulations. 
C. The EEOC Watchers 
The final group of courts, which includes the Fifth 125 and Seventh 
Circuit Courts of Appeals and some district courts of Pennsylvania 
and. Georgia, finds the EEOC's treatment of an individual intake ques-
tionnaire determinative of whether it later may be viewed as a charge 
for purposes of meeting the filing limitation period. Only where the 
EEOC treats an intake questionnaire as it would an actual charge will 
these courts accord it this status. These courts, some of which claim 
to follow the Remedial Approach, 126 in fact reason that the EEOC's 
acceptance of an intake questionnaire as a charge waives the require-
ment that a formal timely charge be submitted.127 Among the factors 
courts have considered in determining the status of a filing is whether 
or not the EEOC assigned a charge number to the case upon receipt of 
the intake questionnaire or notified the employer that a charge had 
been filed against it. 
121. 888 F.2d at 1309. 
122. 888 F.2d at 1309. 
123. See supra text accompanying notes 108·09. 
124. EEOC v. Commercial Office Prods. Co., 486 U.S. 107, 125 (1988) (O'Connor, J., con-
curring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
125. See supra note 108. 
126. E.g., Price v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 687 F.2d 74, 78-79 (5th Cir. 1982) (stating 
that "[c]onsistent with the remedial purposes underlying Title VII, we construe employment 
discrimination charges with the 'utmost liberality,' " but finding also that the EEOC's treating 
the unverified complaint as a charge "is relevant"); see infra text accompanying note 132. 
127. E.g., Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 402 F.2d 357, 360 (7th Cir. 1968) ("If the Com-
mission undertakes to process a charge which is not 'under oath' we perceive no reason why the 
district court should not treat the omission of the oath as a permissive waiver by the 
Commission."). 
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In Philbin v. General Electric Capital Auto Lease, Inc., 128 the Sev-
enth Circuit invoked the reasoning of the Remedial Approach to con-
clude that a subsequently verified intake questionnaire may in some 
situations be considered a valid charge.129 In determining that the 
Philbin case was one of those situations, the court found that "the 
Intake Questionnaire was treated as a charge by Philbin and the 
EEOC .... The EEOC accepted the questionnaire and note and as-
signed a charge number to the claim. . . . [T]he EEOC then notified 
Philbin's employer that a charge had been filed against it."130 
Similarly, in Price v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 131 the Fifth 
Circuit stated: 
The fact that the Commission, at least at the initial stage of the proceed-
ings, considered the circumstances surrounding the receipt of Price's 
complaint sufficient to initiate the administrative process [including issu-
ing an official notice of charge to Bell], is relevant to the determination 
whether the interview [with an Equal Opportunity Specialist] and com-
pletion of Form 283 [Intake Questionnaire] constitutes a 'charge' within 
the meaning of the statute .... "132 
In each of these cases, the EEOC's treatment of the intake question-
naire was essential to the court's conclusion that the questionnaire 
could fulfill the charge requirement. 
Applying a similar rule to reach a different outcome, the District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, in Berger v. Institute of 
Pennsylvania Hospital 133 relied on the fact that the EEOC did not 
notify the plaintiff's employer that a charge had been filed against it 
upon receipt of the timely but unverified intake questionnaire, but in-
stead waited until the plaintiff filed an untimely sworn charge to send 
notice to the employer.134 The Berger court distinguished Price on the 
basis that "the EEOC used [the information submitted by Price] to 
send an official notice of charge to the employer/defendant."135 
Examining the EEOC's view of an intake questionnaire in a differ-
ent light, in Buffington v. General Time Corp., 136 the District Court for 
the Middle District of Georgia relied on the distinction the EEOC has 
drawn between an intake questionnaire and a charge of discrimination 
in determining that a timely questionnaire could not satisfy the filing 
128. 929 F.2d 321 (7th Cir. 1991). 
129. Philbin, 929 F.2d at 323. 
130. 929 F.2d at 324. 
131. 687 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1982). 
132. Price, 687 F.2d at 78-79; see also EEOC v. Calumet Photographic, Inc., 687 F. Supp. 
1249, 1252 (N.D. Ill. 1988) ("where the EEOC considers a private party's filing to be a charge, 
the filing is a charge which tolls the statute"). 
133. No. 88-6650, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4956 (E.D. Pa. May 8, 1989). 
134. Berger, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4956, at *2. 
135. Berger, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4956, at *4. 
136. 677 F. Supp. 1186 (M.D. Ga. 1988). 
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requirement. 137 The court cited an EEOC regulation 138 that states 
that the EEOC shall receive information from any person, but 
"[w]here the information discloses that a person is entitled to file a 
charge with the Commission, the appropriate officer shall render assist-
ance in the filing of a charge,"139 as evidence that the EEOC viewed 
the questionnaire and the charge as distinct in both purpose and form. 
While providing a more flexible standard in keeping with the intent 
of the statute, the approach of the "EEOC Watchers" provides little 
certainty and creates opportunities for uneven enforcement. The deci-
sion of an individual Intake Equal Opportunity Specialist to assign a 
charge number or notify an employer upon receipt of an intake ques-
tionnaire, rather than to place the questionnaire in an appropriate sus-
pension file or await submission of a formal charge, should not 
determine whether a claimant receives a hearing on the merits. By 
adopting the views of the EEOC on a claim-by-claim basis, the courts 
defer to the individual judgment of hundreds of EEOC employees 
across the nation. Variations in procedure and exercise of reasonable 
discretion are unavoidable in a decentralized agency140 which handles 
the enormous volume of complaints received by the EEOC. The prob-
lem is caused not so much by the EEOC's handling of complaints but 
by the inordinate significance the courts lodge in the actions of Com-
mission personnel. Finally, a court's use of one EEOC regulation to 
deny enforcement of another is an equally haphazard way of resolving 
claims. 
D. Summary 
Currently, the courts utilize three overlapping approaches to deter-
mine whether a timely filed intake questionnaire may satisfy the statu-
tory requirement that a charge of discrimination be filed under oath. 
Although none of these methods is flawless, the failure of the No 
Oath, No Charge group to accommodate the strong judicial statement 
that Title VII be liberally construed is an unacceptable distortion of 
the statute's underlying policy. The EEOC Watchers, whose reason-
ing seems constrained only by the whims of EEOC personnel, create a 
system that provides for infinite flexibility but little predictability or 
uniformity in enforcement. The Remedial Approach, although it 
might not adequately address the possible conflict between the lan-
guage of the Title VII statute and the EEOC's regulations, offers the 
137. Buffington, 677 F.Supp. at 1193. 
138. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.6 (1991). 
139. 677 F. Supp. at 1193 (finding a distinction between an EEOC questionnaire and an 
EEOC charge based on their different functions). 
140. For a description of the structure of the agency, see 4 Empl. Discrimination Coordina-
tor (Research Inst. Am.) 11 46,104 (Mar. 17, 1992) ("The EEOC has three types of field offices: 
district, area, and local. There are currently 22 district offices, 18 area offices, and 9 local offices, 
each of which is headed by its own Director."). 
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best method of attaining the congressional goals of providing wide re-
lief from employment discrimination, facilitating private enforcement 
of worthy claims, and furnishing employers some level of protection 
from frivolous claims. 
III. A PROPOSED SOLUTION 
In light of the shortcomings of two of the three existing treatments 
of the oath issue by the courts, this Part proposes that Congress 
amend Title VII to reflect the position of the Remedial Approach 
group, 141 thus eliminating the apparent conflict between the statutory 
language, the EEOC's regulations, and the emerging consensus posi-
tion of the circuits.142 Among the three approaches discussed, the 
courts that construe Title VII liberally to provide victims of alleged 
discrimination access to the courts come closest to effectuating con-
gressional intent. This interpretation offers other advantages as well. 
Section III.A argues that with the enormous backlog of complaints 
that has developed at the EEOC, private enforcement is often a claim-
ant's only hope for prompt resolution of a discriminatory situation and 
thus should be facilitated. Section 111.B notes that under existing law, 
when charges are filed with the EEOC under the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act, a law with intent similar to Title VII, they are 
not required by statute to be verified at any point in the administrative 
process. Section III.C proposes the text of the amendment and ex-
plains its effects. This Part concludes that the Remedial Approach 
balances the interests of Title VII claimants and their employers in an 
equitable manner. The statute should require that a charge be verified 
prior to the initiation of an EEOC investigation but not necessarily 
prior to the expiration of the filing limitations period. 
A. The Need for the Private Attorney General 
Almost from its inception the EEOC has labored under a burden 
which far exceeds its expertise and resources. In its first year of opera-
tion, the agency received more than four times as many complaints as 
anticipated.143 Between 1969 and 1975 the number of charges filed 
mushroomed from just over 12,000 to more than 71,000 annually.144 
More recently, the EEOC is widely reported as receiving 100,000 
charges of discrimination every year.14s 
141. See supra section 11.B. 
142. See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 10, § 11.3, at 431; 2 ARTHUR B. LARSON, EMPLOY-
MENT DISCRIMINATION § 48.ll(b)(l) (1990 & Supp. 1991). 
143. Belton, supra note 1, at 921 (stating that EEOC expected 2000 charges but received 
8854). 
144. Id. 
145. Bruce D. Butterfield, Shunning Old Paths to Equality at Work; Affirmative Action Under 
Fire, BosroN GLOBE, Oct. 20, 1991, at 1 (Business section); Anti-Bias Agencies Tum Deaf Ear to 
Complaints, NEWSDAY, Oct. 22, 1988, at 18 (Viewpoints section). 
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The result of this overwhelming workload has been an immense 
backlog of pending charges. The EEOC's Combined Annual Report 
for FY 1986-1988 stated that at the end of fiscal year 1988 the 
agency's pending inventory stood at 53, 780 charges.146 Reportedly as 
high as 126,000 in 1976,147 this accumulation of charges has affected 
the Commission's ability to provide complainants relief in at least two 
ways. First, the EEOC is supposed to process charges within 180 days 
of receipt148 but seldom is able to achieve this goal. Although re-
ported at 185 days in 1984,149 by 1991 average processing time had 
climbed to 284 days - more than nine months. 150 The inability to 
provide reasonably prompt relief leaves those complainants who prefer 
to await completion of EEOC efforts to resolve a claim before suing in 
an uncomfortable limbo. Also, in some extreme cases, where the 
EEOC moves so slowly that the equitable doctrine of !aches will apply 
when a complainant finally does sue, this choice can foreclose oppor-
tunities for relief altogether. 151 Further, the agency's backlog has been 
a convenient and obvious target for EEOC critics.152 As a result, 
146. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY CoMMISSION, 1986-1988 CoMBINED ANNUAL 
REPORT 7 (1990). Pending inventory is the current workload that exists in addition to charges 
received during the fiscal year. For example, in fiscal year 1987 the EEOC had responsibility for 
processing 62,074 newly received charges but resolved only 53,482 charges. The remainder be-
came part of the pending inventory. In fiscal year 1988, the EEOC resolved 11,896 more charges 
than it was required to process that year, thus the pending inventory declined slightly. Despite 
this gain, the pending inventory is still equal to approximately 90% of the workload which the 
EEOC is required to process each year. See id. 
147. Richard I. Lehr, EEOC Case-Handling Procedures: Problems and Solutions, 34 ALA. L. 
REv. 241, 246 (1983). 
148. EEOC is granted exclusive jurisdiction over the charge for 180 days. After expiration of 
180 days from the time of filing, the charging party may request a notice of right to sue, regard· 
less of whether the agency has completed processing of the claim. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1988); 
29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(a)(l) (1991). 
149. ABA Panel Discusses Preparation of EEO Cases, Trial Strategies, Burdens of Proof in 
Discrimination Cases, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 132, at A6 (July 10, 1985). 
150. Butterfield, supra note 145. But see From Platform Plank to Landmark Law, Title VII 
History Recounted at 25-Year Mark, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 93, at Cl, C3 (May 16, 1989) 
(quoting R. Gaull Silberman, vice chairman of the EEOC, that she expects the Commission soon 
to reach its goal of six months processing time). 
151. See Cleveland Newspaper Guild v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 839 F.2d 1147 (6th Cir. 
1988) (rehearing en bane). In this case, due to the EEOC's backlog, it took 10 years for the 
agency to undertake and complete an investigation, make a finding of reasonable cause, and 
unsuccessfully seek conciliation. When the plaintiff finally sued, the court affirmed a grant of 
summary judgment to the defendant, holding that !aches may apply in a Title VII suit and that 
here, the EEOC's delay failed to justify the plaintiff's inaction. 
152. GAO Says EEOC. State Agencies Not Fully Investigating Charges, 26 Govt. Empl. Rel. 
Rep. (BNA) No. 1287, at 1538 (Oct. 31, 1988) (discussing a General Accounting Office report 
which found that the EEOC failed to reduce its massive backlog of cases); Employment, Wo-
men's Groups Urge Congress to Monitor Enforcement of Anti-Discrimination Laws. Daily Lab. 
Rep. (BNA) No. 206, at A16, A17 (Oct. 24, 1991) (quoting Judith Lichtman, president of Wo-
men's Legal Defense Fund, that EEOC has been plagued by a large baqklog and slow response 
time); Allen Greenberg, NAACP Sees Rising Job Discrimination Against Minorities, UPI, Jan. 12, 
1988, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, UPI file (quoting NAACP attorney James Foster that 
EEOC investigators are overwhelmed by a backlog of complaints). 
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EEOC officials have felt compelled to restructure the charge process-
ing system to maximize case closings, arguably at the expense of more 
thorough but time consuming investigations.153 This emphasis on im-
proving the numbers makes the backlog figure an unreliable indicator 
of the quality of service provided to complainants. 
Demands for investigations of alleged employment discrimination 
have consistently overwhelmed the EEOC. As a result, private liti-
gants historically have shouldered much of the burden of developing 
employment discrimination case law.154 In recognition of this trend, 
the EEOC has developed programs to expedite claimants' litigation 
efforts, including "activities to develop and train a private Title VII 
bar."155 These activities range from educational seminars to mainte-
nance of a panel of attorneys by each EEOC district office "to review 
case files and provide legal assistance ... to charging parties" consid-
ering suits in federal court.156 However, this is not enough to ensure 
appropriate attention to each claim. Given the EEOC's mixed mo-
tives157 for reducing its backlog, elimination of these accumulated 
charges would provide inadequate assurance that complainants were 
receiving fair consideration of their claims. In this context, Congress 
should amend the statute to facilitate the ability of victims of discrimi-
nation to pursue their claims in court rather than permit the courts to 
rely on an overly technical interpretation of Title VII to dismiss 
claims. 
B. Filing Procedures Under the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act 
Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA)158 and Title VII in response to similar problems. ADEA was 
passed three years after Title VII to prohibit discrimination in employ-
ment on the basis of age. The EEOC assumed responsibility for en-
153. Greenberg, supra note 152 (reporting that due to the EEOC's backlog, a "purported 
quota requir[es] EEOC investigators to dispose of at least 85 cases a year''); ABA Panel, supra 
note 149 (reporting that the EEOC "came under pressure from both management and civil rights 
groups for placing so much emphasis on RCP," the Rapid Charge Processing system); Lee May, 
Jobs Panel Failed to Properly Investigate Large Number of Bias Cases, Report Says, L.A. TIMES, 
Oct. 11, 1988, at Cl7 (quoting a GAO report that there existed "a perception by investigative 
staff that EEOC was more interested in reducing the large charge inventory than in performing 
full investigations"). 
154. Belton, supra note 1, at 924. 
155. 4 Empl. Discrimination Coordinator (Research Inst. Am.) 1[ 46,110 (Mar. 17, 1992). 
156. Id. 
157. Although the EEOC may wish to reduce its backlog to be more responsive to complain-
ants, it also has incentive to do so to quiet the agency's critics. Depending upon the method used 
to achieve this goal, efforts to reduce the backlog could have a negative impact on the quality of 
claims processing. 
158. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codi-
fied as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1988)). 
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forcement of ADEA on July 1, 1979.159 Title VII and ADEA are 
presumed to have comparable remedial intent and because the EEOC 
assumed direct responsibility for ADEA, they are similarly adminis-
tered and enforced. Further, the courts often construe ADEA in a 
manner similar to Title VII. 160 Both statutes are triggered by the filing 
of a charge with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged discrimina-
tory act, and complainants under each statute must wait a prescribed 
period while the EEOC seeks conciliation before pursuing their claims 
in federal court. 161 Given these parallels, one would expect the related 
statutory language on the filing of charges to be similar as well. 
Despite the similarities in underlying intent and administrative 
procedures, however, Title VII and ADEA have different statutory 
requirements for filing a charge. While Title VII demands that a 
charge be filed in writing under oath, ADEA is silent on the details of 
an age discrimination claim. The regulations promulgated by the 
EEOC fill this gap by requiring that, at a minimum, an ADEA charge 
"be in writing," "name the prospective respondent," and "generally 
allege the discriminatory act(s). Charges received in person or by tele-
phone [are to] be reduced to writing."162 This skeletal information 
may be augmented under the same liberal amendment policy that gov-
erns Title VII charges.163 Thus, because EEOC regulations allow the 
additional statutory requirement for verification under Title VII to be 
fulfilled through the amendment process, the EEOC handles the in-
take of charges filed under ADEA and Title VII virtually 
identically .164 
The differences between the two statutes continue to narrow. Until 
recently, ADEA, unlike Title VII, provided a two-year statute of limi-
tations within which claimants had to file in court. 165 The Civil 
Rights Act of 1991,166 however, deleted this ADEA provision,167 and 
159. Reorg. Plan No. 1 of 1978, 3 C.F.R. 321 (1978), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 1366 
(1988), and in 92 Stat. 3781 (1978). 
160. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395 (1991) (White and Stevens, JJ., concurring) 
(Blackmun and Marshall, JJ., dissenting) (relying on Title VII legislative history to interpret 
ADEA); Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Solimino, No. 89-1895, 111 S. Ct. 2166, 2170 (1991) 
(describing Title VII as a "closely parallel context" to ADEA); Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 
Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 395 n.11 (1982) (stating that ADEA "was modeled after Title VII"); Oscar 
Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979) (stating that "ADEA and Title VII share a 
common purpose, the elimination of discrimination in the workplace"). 
161. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) and § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1988) with 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) 
(1988). 
162. 29 C.F.R. § 1626.6 (1991). 
163. 29 C.F.R. § 1626.8(c) (1991). 
164. See Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 764 n.11 (1979) (acknowledging that 
ADEA complaints will be processed under the same system as Title VII complaints). 
165. 29 U.S.C. § 626(e)(l) (1988) (making applicable 29 U.S.C. § 255 (1988)). 
166. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). 
167. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 115, 105 Stat. 1071, 1079 (1991). 
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inserted new language that mimics that of Title VII. 168 Under the 
revised Act, like a Title VII complainant, an individual filing under 
ADEA would have ninety days from the time the EEOC notified him 
or her of the termination of its proceedings - rather than two years 
from the time of the alleged discriminatory act - to sue in federal 
court. 169 As the administrative procedures for processing claims 
under Title VII and ADEA move closer together, the remaining statu-
tory differences become increasingly anomalous. It is apparent from 
the EEOC's procedures that the practical effects of verifying a charge 
at the time of filing are minimal in light of the agency's liberal amend-
ment practices. Moreover, the EEOC receives and processes many 
charges under ADEA, a statute which does not require verification 
and which is substantially similar to Title VII, without significant ill 
effects. Therefore, an amendment permitting a more flexible verifica-
tion policy for charges filed under Title VII would not be overly 
burdensome. 
C. An Amendment to Section 706(b) 
Section 706(b) should be amended to read in relevant part: 
Charges shall be in writing [under oath or affirmation] and shall contain 
such information and be in such form as the Commission requires .... 
Any individual filing a complaint shall verify such complaint by oath or 
affirmation prior to the initiation of an EEOC investigation. If the Com-
mission determines after such investigation that there is not reasonable 
cause to believe that the charge is true, it shall dismiss the charge and 
promptly notify the person claiming to be aggrieved and the respondent 
of its action.17° 
An amendment to section 706(b) specifying that charges must be 
verified prior to the initiation of an EEOC investigation would cause 
little if any disruption of the existing relationship between the EEOC, 
complainants, and their employers. The agency already operates 
under a system that permits amendment of charges. Title VII requires 
that the EEOC notify employers of complaints filed against them 
within ten days of the EEOC's receipt of a charge.171 Notice to em-
ployers enables them to retain all employment records which may be 
168. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 115, 105 Stat 1071, 1079 (1991) ("29 U.S.C. § 626(e) is amended 
... by adding at the end, the following: If a charge filed with the Commission under this Act is 
dismissed or the proceedings of the Commission are otherwise terminated by the Commission, 
the Commission shall notify the person aggrieved. A civil action may be brought under this 
section by a person defined in section l l(a) against the respondent named in the charge within 90 
days after the date of the receipt of such notice."). For comparison to Title VII, see 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-5(f)(l) (1988). 
169. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 115, 105 Stat 1071, 1079 (1991). 
170. Text which would be deleted by the proposed amendment is enclosed in brackets. New 
language appears in italics. 
171. 42 u.s.c. § 2000e-5(b) (1988). 
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relevant to the discrimination claim.172 Such records not only facili-
tate the EEOC's investigation but also may assist an employer in pre-
paring a defense.113 According to the Enforcement Manager of the 
EEOC's Detroit District Office, the EEOC typically does not notify 
employers that a complaint has been filed against them until the com-
plainant verifies the charge.174 However, if it appears likely that a 
complainant will be unable to file a sworn charge before the statutory 
period runs, notice will be sent to an employer on the basis of the 
intake questionnaire.175 This notice does not describe the nature of 
the allegations contained in the unverified intake questionnaire, but 
informs the employer that a claim has been filed against her. 176 Once 
the complaint is verified, an employer receives an amended notice pro-
viding the date and place of the allegations and detailing the statutory 
basis for the claim.177 Only at this point may an EEOC investigator 
proceed to request from the employer any relevant documents or 
records. 178 
In light of recent regulatory changes in record keeping require-
ments, any additional burden on employers from the proposed amend-
ment would be minimal. Effective August 26, 1991, the EEOC 
extended the mandatory retention period for all voluntarily created 
employment records from six months to one year. 179 The EEOC ex-
plained that the six-month requirement "was promulgated before Title 
VII was amended in 1972 to change the time limit for filing a charge 
from 90 days to 180 days."180 In light of the extended filing period, six 
172. The EEOC's recordkeeping requirements are minimal. Each employer covered by Title 
VII with 100 or more employers must submit annually and keep on hand Standard Form 100, 
the Employer Information Report EE0-1, which classifies the workforce by sex and race. The 
EEOC "reserves the right to impose [additional] recordkeeping requirements upon ••• employers 
•.. when in its judgment, such records ••• are further required to accomplish the purposes of 
title VII." 29 C.F.R. § 1602.12 (1991). Title VII grants such authority to the EEOC explicitly. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(c) (1988). If employers voluntarily create additional employment records, 
the EEOC requires that they be kept for one year after their creation or the personnel action they 
concern. 56 Fed. Reg. 35753, 35755 (1991) (amending 29 C.F.R. § 1602.14 (1991)); see infra 
notes 179-84 and accompanying text. 
173. See EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 74-75 (1984) (stating that the reason that 
Congress added the 10-day notice requirement in 1972 "seems to have been to provide employers 
fair notice that accusations of discrimination have been leveled against them and that they can 
soon expect an investigation by the EEOC"). The Court in Shell found that notice of a charge 
must contain information sufficient to enable the employer to determine which records he or she 
must retain for EEOC examination during the investigation stage. Shell, 466 U.S. at 78. 
174. Telephone Interview with Earl L. Benson, Enforcement Manager, EEOC Detroit Dis-
trict Office (Nov. 15, 1991 and Jan. 28, 1992). 
175. Id. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. The second notice relates back to the date of the first notice in the same way that 
the amended (verified) charge relates back to the date of the intake questionnaire. 
178. Id. 
179. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,753 (1991). 
180. Id. at 35,754. 
October 1992] Note - EEOC Charge 153 
months was no longer sufficient to ensure that employers "necessarily 
will have retained" records relevant to a charge.181 The Commission 
stated further that the "retention of the records for the period of one 
year will increase only minimally, if at all, the employer's cost of 
maintaining the records."182 This new requirement will decrease the 
likelihood that employers receiving a general notice of a discrimina-
tion complaint will inadvertently dispose of employment records 
which may prove helpful to them or to the EEOC.183 Once the EEOC 
notifies an employer of the content of a charge, all relevant records 
must be retained until final disposition of the charge.184 
Congress should amend Title VII to require only that verification 
occur prior to the initiation of an EEOC investigation. Conforming 
the statutory language to the EEOC's current practice as described 
above would affect only those complainants who relied on the amend-
ment procedure to verify their claims and subsequently chose to pur-
sue their claims in court. For these complainants who are dissatisfied 
with the EEOC's findings or for whom the EEOC is unable to obtain 
relief by conciliation, the amendment would ensure that courts that 
have refused to honor the EEOC's longstanding regulations permitting 
amendment could no longer decline to examine the merits of a claim 
on those grounds. Bringing these courts into conformity with the ma-
jority of the circuits would further the intent of Title VII and facilitate 
uniformity in the resolution of employment discrimination claims. 
CONCLUSION 
The existing morass of statutes, regulations and common law that 
determines the ability of Title VII claimants to pursue their claims in 
court is filled with inconsistencies. In order to facilitate uniform treat-
ment of Title VII claims in a manner that complies with the underly-
ing intent of the statute, Congress should amend the requirement that 
a charge be filed under oath to mandate instead that it be verified prior 
to initiation of an EEOC investigation. This approach honors the re-
medial intent of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It also safeguards the 
right of private enforcement, which was necessary to secure passage of 
the original legislation and continues to be necessary due to the 
181. Id. 
182. Id. 
The Commission estimates that the changes ... increasing the title VII records retention 
period from six months to one year will result in an increased recordkeeping burden on 
employers of approximately 9,000 burden hours annually ..•• The Commission believes that 
this increase in burden hours is de minimis and that the modifications will not have a signifi-
cant impact on a substantial number of small employers. 
Id. 
183. If necessary, the EEOC could extend further the retention period to provide additional 
protection for employers who are concerned that they may prematurely dispose of relevant 
records. 
184. 29 C.F.R. § 1602.14(a) (1991). 
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EEOC's excessive workload. Moreover, the proposed amendment 
shows appropriate deference to the EEOC's interpretation of its au-
thorizing statute and provides adequate protection for employers from 
frivolous claims. 
